What Aussie software needs to learn about the US market

Australia produces world-class software talent. What we do not yet produce, at scale, is world-class software exports.

This is not a criticism of founders. It is a systems problem—one that a new organisation like Software Australia is uniquely positioned to address, if we are honest about what the US market actually rewards, and where Australian software companies consistently fall short.

The opportunity is enormous

The risk of mis-execution is equally large.

Australia’s startup ecosystem is increasingly productive at the early stage. Successive Startup Muster reports show strong participation in SaaS, deep technical capability, and improving founder diversity. Yet those same reports also point to persistent weaknesses that matter most for exports: limited international revenue concentration, especially from the United States; underdeveloped go-to-market capability relative to product engineering; low exposure to US-based customers, buyers, and procurement dynamics; and a tendency to treat “product” as a collection of features rather than as a market-validated system.

In short, we are good at building software, but less good at building businesses designed for the US.

The US is not simply a larger version of the Australian market. It is a fundamentally different one. It is hyper-competitive, with funded alternatives everywhere. It is customer-first by default, with buyers expecting immediate value, clarity, and proof. It is shaped by investors, meaning product decisions are constantly assessed for scale, margins, and defensibility. And it is narrative-driven, where positioning matters as much as performance.

In this environment, product development is not a roadmap exercise. It is a continuous negotiation between customers, competitors, and capital markets.

This difference has real consequences for Australian startups

Locally, product development often centres on feature completeness, technical elegance, close feedback from early customers, and milestones aligned to grants or programs. In the US, product development revolves around something else entirely: a sharply defined buyer problem, a sense of urgency and budget ownership, clear category positioning, and evidence that wins can be repeated rather than explained away as exceptions.

A US-ready product is rarely finished. Instead, it is legible. It must be legible to customers, who should immediately understand what problem it solves. It must be legible to buyers, who need to see why it is worth paying for. And it must be legible to investors, who are assessing whether it can scale quickly and sustainably. The US loves the MVP!

Customer - first or led?

One of the most common export mistakes Australian startups make is confusing customer-first with customer-led. Early design partners are often local, supportive, and unusually patient. They are also frequently unrepresentative of the US market. In the United States, customers churn quickly, buyers do not educate vendors, procurement processes test credibility early, and referenceability matters sooner than many founders expect.

Being customer-first in this context means designing products that onboard quickly, demonstrate obvious return on investment, signal trust at an enterprise level, and show clear paths for expansion. It does not mean endlessly custom-building for a handful of early customers and hoping scale will follow.

Another cultural gap appears in how we talk about investors. Too often, being “investor-friendly” is treated as a compromise of values. In reality, US investors are not funding ideas; they are funding large markets, credible growth loops, strong positioning against competitors, and teams that understand capital as a tool rather than a threat.

This does not mean founders should optimise pitch decks at the expense of products. It means product strategy and capital strategy must make sense together. Valuations are shaped by revenue quality as much as growth, and exit pathways are not failures but constraints that influence design choices early.

A new hope

As a new organisation, Software Australia can offer founders a rare opportunity to approach this differently. It can help founders build US market literacy rather than simply offering US market access. It can frame exports as a capability developed from the outset, not as a late-stage ambition. It can support legacy software companies alongside startups, many of which are closer to export readiness than the ecosystem tends to acknowledge. And it can ground product and go-to-market support in competition analysis and buyer reality, not peer comparison.

Landing pads, trade missions, and demo days all have their place, but only when companies arrive structurally prepared.

Words into action

Australia has spent years talking about becoming a “software nation.” The next phase is more difficult, and more important: becoming a software exporter that can repeatedly succeed in the US market. That will require fewer slogans and more honesty about how competition works, how products win, and how markets actually behave.

Software Australia embodies the opportunity to help reset that conversation. Not by telling founders they are failing, but by helping them build companies that are designed to win where the bar is highest.

The code is good. Now it is time to build for customers—and markets—that demand more.

 

About the Author – Jim Cooper is a US based senior board adviser to Software Australia on commercialisation.